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The U.S. military currently utilizes a unit-rotational model to provide forces to 
geographic combatant commanders waging ground wars. This model has its roots in 
policy and historical perception, not strategy and tactics. When applied to 
counterinsurgency, weaknesses that undermine long-term effectiveness become apparent. 
Through an examination of the basis of the current model, its performance in the recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and current and historical case studies, this thesis 
explores alternatives to the rotational model. This thesis finds that a hybrid model that 
combines the advantages of the current system with historical and current examples from 
other nations could increase the effectiveness of units in long-term counterinsurgency 
campaigns. 
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Iraq, 2007. A glance at the map. Dead Girl Road. It is dangerous. Avoid 
it. Why is it called that? No one knows. “And this far into the war, no one 
seemed to care.”1  
This anecdote, drawn from David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers, illustrates a larger 
problem with the current U.S. method of “rotational warfare” in counterinsurgency.2 
Perceptions and goals are constrained by deployment and redeployment dates. Careers 
are made or broken in a single deployment. Villages, politicians, local forces, and 
knowledge are vitally important for a period of six months to a year, never to be thought 
of again. These are curious phenomena in conflicts with the potential to span decades.  
The way America currently fights its wars—utilizing an all-volunteer force in a 
sustained unit rotational manner—is radically different from times past. This method 
ostensibly draws lessons from previous conflicts to maximize effectiveness and win wars 
better and more quickly. An enormous body of literature exists that studies how the U.S. 
has fought wars and the effectiveness of the means utilized, but examination of the most 
recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in their totality is just now beginning to occur. 
While the lessons of the past have undoubtedly informed the current method of 
employment of the American military, the effectiveness of the current practice of 
employing all-volunteer units on a rotational basis over extended periods of time is 
worthy of particular examination. The lessons drawn from such an examination are key to 
developing force management and implementation strategies in future conflicts.  
One lesson that has been identified and is crucial to future planning is the lack of 
attention paid to continuity in U.S. counterinsurgency. Continuity is a vital component in 
developing and implementing successful counterinsurgency campaigns. As the U.S. 
rotational warfare model has shown in recent years, inattention to continuity has 
detrimental effects on counterinsurgency efforts, and a better method can and should be 
                                                 
1 David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (New York: Picador, 2009), 31. 
2 William S. Sobat, “Relief in Place: Managing Transition of Authority,” Special Warfare 22, no. 1 
(2009): 29. 
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implemented. To identify such a method, this thesis first examines counterinsurgency 
theory and past U.S. practices. Shortcomings stemming from the use of units 
interchangeably point to flaws in the assumptions that underpin the rotational warfare 
model. Using historic and contemporary case studies drawn from the British and Indian 
Armies, lessons can be learned about ways to redress the lack of continuity. This thesis 
will explore some of these lessons and propose measures that address some of the failings 
of the rotational model to allow the U.S. to more effectively conduct counterinsurgency 
campaigns in the future. 
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II. CONTINUITY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY 
Theories related to counterinsurgency are distinct from theories about 
conventional war and, like theories in all disciplines, have changed over time. Lessons 
from different conflicts have been incorporated and dispersed throughout the body of 
knowledge and even, from time to time, changed some of the precepts that are generally 
accepted. The most acknowledged and best-advocated theories, however, maintain the 
same basic tenets. For instance: an insurgency gains its power and sustenance from the 
population; to effectively defeat the insurgency, it must be separated from this base and 
destroyed or reconciled; wresting a controlling share of the population from the 
insurgency by addressing the underlying grievances fueling the insurgency is a primary 
way to prevent resurgence.3 Theories differ as to the methods and tactics that the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent should and have employed to effectively achieve these 
goals, but this framework is generally accepted.  
Modern U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is predicated on experiences from past 
conflicts and relies on the work of many theorists and practitioners, but draws a large part 
of its heritage from the more classic work of David Galula, Frank Kitson, Roger 
Trinquier, and Sir Robert Thompson albeit through the modernizing lens of David 
Kilcullen, John Nagl, and others.4 One constant that persists in the classic theories is the 
importance of continuity. Counterinsurgency is painstaking work with gains measured by 
inches not miles, and solutions are oft-characterized as “long-term.”5 Possessing a 
detailed understanding of the local area, the population, and the enemy are considered 
paramount, but gaining this nuanced knowledge takes time and cannot easily be 
communicated or repackaged for dissemination.6 The chief method of obtaining this 
                                                 
3 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966), 111–120. 
4 Conrad Crane, “United States,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and 
Challenges, ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (London: Routledge, 2010), 61, 67. 
5 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2006), 1–24. 
6 John Nagl, preface to Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, by David Galula (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2006), Kindle edition, 37–46.  
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knowledge of the populace, terrain, and enemy is through long-term, sustained 
relationships between ground forces and the populace.7 Key to developing reciprocal 
relations with members of the populace as part of this learning process, trust must be 
developed between counterinsurgent forces and locals; trust is also critical for long-term 
solutions to take root and gain support.8 Time and contact are the two necessary 
ingredients for fostering this trust.  
An important truism about human nature—namely, that trust is not communicable 
from one individual (counterinsurgent) to the next—is not accounted for in current 
doctrine.9 David Galula, a veteran of the French experience in Algeria, contends that, to 
effectively maintain control of the populace, counterinsurgents should be dispersed 
among the population in an assigned area and “always work there.”10 While this 
statement is not meant to be taken literally, the concept communicated is two-fold. First, 
the counterinsurgent can only truly gain the required knowledge through close, constant, 
long-term contact with the populace. Second, that an impression must be given to the 
populace that the counterinsurgent, like the insurgent, is not a transient, but is instead 
vested in the long-term interests of the local area and populace.11  
General Sir Frank Kitson, a former commander of the Land Forces of the United 
Kingdom and prominent counterinsurgency theorist, is very specific on the importance of 
continuity in a counterinsurgency environment.  
The first of these problems concerns continuity because the whole core of 
the business undoubtedly lies in the deduction process which by its very 
nature takes time and which can only be carried out by the tactical 
commander. If tactical commanders are changed too frequently no long-
term development of information will be attempted and officers will for 
ever [sic] be aiming for quick results in terms of numbers of insurgents 
killed as opposed to enemy organizations rooted out and destroyed. 
                                                 
7 Nagl, preface to Counterinsurgency Warfare, 37–46. 
8 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Kindle edition, 37.  
9 Jack Barbalet, “A Characterization of Trust, and Its Consequences,” Theory and Society 38, no. 4 
(2009): 378.  
10 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 
Kindle edition, 1222–1223.  
11 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1186–1189.  
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Furthermore the tactical commander will always be at a disadvantage 
compared with his opponent who may have been operating in the District 
for months or even years before he arrived.12 
Likewise, Sir Robert Thompson, a respected British counterinsurgency theorist with 
extensive experience in both Malaya and Vietnam, addressed continuity in the U.S. 
advisory effort in the initial stages of counterinsurgency in Vietnam.  
[W]eakness in Vietnam . . . stemmed partly from the fact that American 
military personnel did such short tours. If unaccompanied by their 
families, tours were limited to one year. However high the calibre, and it 
was uniformly good, no great achievements in counter-insurgency are 
possible in such a short period. All that the individual can hope to do is to 
leave his post at the end of the year as he would like to find it. He cannot 
do more than prepare the ground for his successors.13 
For these classical theorists, continuity is a precious commodity that is necessary in order 
to provide the counterinsurgent force sufficient knowledge to understand the local 
situation, adapt, and prosecute effective measures by, with, and through the population 
and against the insurgency. In other words, persistent contact is needed between the same 
forces and the population in the same area over time. 
More recent theories, like those advanced by David Kilcullen and Steven Metz, 
have taken what are understood to be modern realities into account. The concepts of 
continuity and institutional memory, developed in units over time in order to craft 
tailored solutions for specific areas, have been supplanted by “adaptability,” 
organizational learning, and a deliberate turnover process to the next unit aided by 
technology.14 Very rarely is consideration given to the possibility that a departing unit 
will return to the same area. There is a common belief that a comprehensive handover, if 
it is well-planned from the beginning of a unit’s tour, will make professional, adaptable 
organizations effective enough to succeed in counterinsurgency. Technology and this 
                                                 
12 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), 131. 
13 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 165.  
14 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2, 36, Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Special Series: 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 25, 
and Stephen Metz, Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2007), 40. 
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turnover period are acceptable substitutes for continuity, or so current thinking suggests. 
This concept is reflected in both modern theories and current U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine.15 Indeed, continuity is mentioned only in passing in current U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine under the general concept of “transitions” of “stream[s] of 
activity,” and with regard to intelligence analysis. Continuity of forces is covered, but it 
is buried in a paragraph on an eye chart-sized table. Even the unit handover is relegated 
to only brief mentions in appendices.16 
According to these same modern theories and doctrine, meanwhile, organizations 
are still expected to master knowledge of the culture, people, terrain, and enemy, as well 
as develop relationships and gain trust with indigenous peoples, local governments, and 
host-nation security forces in order to generate creative locally-based solutions to 
counterinsurgency challenges.17 The deficit of time afforded to these tasks is ostensibly 
erased by technology. But—are technology and adaptability sufficient to bridge this gap? 
A shift in perception of what a counterinsurgent is has occurred. Tellingly, terms 
previously used to describe counterinsurgents like “sector,” “static,” and “stationary” 
forces (meant to connote the ability of forces to remain in an area long enough to gain 
detailed knowledge, not to imply lack of initiative) have given way to the concept of 
dynamic adaptable forces.18 Consequently, according to more modern interpretations, the 
environment is ever-evolving and, while an effort must be made to understand the 
environment to develop the right solutions, the rapid pace of change and complexity 
mean full knowledge can never be attained.19 There is a dichotomy between what classic 
theories suggest and what exists today, which is ostensibly built on those same theories.  
                                                 
15 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 36 and Field Manual 3–24, A-8, C-4. 
16 Field Manual 3–24, 2–10, 2–25, 3–33, A-8. While not finalized, an initial 2013 draft of the revised 
Field Manual 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies continues with the theme of the effective 
transition as adequate substitute for continuity and the unit rotational concept is alluded to as an assumed 
fact (pp. 7-7-8, 8-17, 9-3). 
17 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 3, 30, 37 and Field Manual 3–24, 1–25–27, C-4. 
18 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Combat Studies Institute, 1985), 73, Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1146, Kitson, Low Intensity 
Operations, 92, and Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2. 
19 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 3. 
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It seems critical to examine how this disjuncture has developed. By examining the degree 
to which continuity was taken seriously in past U.S. counterinsurgency endeavors, we 
should be able to identify when and why the shift in its significance occurred.  
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III. CONTINUITY IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
The United States has engaged in counterinsurgency since its inception. 
Throughout the eighteen and ninteenth centuries, the U.S. waged campaigns against 
various Native American tribes in North America. Since the turn of the twentieth century, 
the U.S. has repeatedly engaged in counterinsurgency on foreign soil in the Philippines, 
the Caribbean and Latin America, Vietnam, the Cold War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
Whether the military can be said to have accomplished continuity during these 
counterinsurgencies is itself inconsistent. At times, continuity was inadvertently 
achieved; at others, it was given no heed. Some prominent individuals in the military 
establishment during the twentieth century lent credence to the concept of continuity, but, 
often, institutional and higher level operational considerations outweighed any emphasis 
on continuity as a matter of course. 
A. CONTINUITY IN THE WARS OF THE PAST 
1. Philippines 1899–1902  
During the Philippine War, U.S. volunteer and regular units were specifically 
raised, trained, and deployed to fight nationalist forces after gaining the territory as a 
result of the U.S. defeat of the Spanish during the Spanish-American War. The 
conventional fight was short. After their defeat, Ronaldo Aguinaldo’s pro-independence 
formations subsequently reverted to the guerrilla warfare strategy previously employed 
during Spanish rule. The U.S. commander, Major General Elwell Otis, imagining the war 
over and the guerrilla threat merely a nuisance, divided the country into provinces, 
districts, and zones. Each received assigned forces and garrisons to help administer 
military government and provide security. In essence, they were to act as an occupation 
force with the needs of the Filipinos in mind. Incidentally, the combination of isolation 





guerrilla and civil military operations tailored to its local area with knowledge gained 
over time. Often, this proved extremely successful for countering the still-simmering 
insurgency.20  
Recognizing the effectiveness of these tactics, Major General Arthur MacArthur, 
first a subordinate commander under Otis and later commander of U.S. forces in the 
Philippines, developed a strategy that incorporated such local solutions within the overall 
campaign plan to counter the insurgency. Howard Taft, head of the commission that 
oversaw the transfer of power from U.S. military to U.S. civilian control, told President 
McKinley that these efforts by local commanders would dictate the success of the war in 
the Philippines. This reliance on continuity and its benefit to counterinsurgency 
operations, however, would not last and, after only a year, MacArthur was sent to other 
duties thanks to personality conflicts with Taft. His replacement, Major General Adna 
Chaffee, had no taste for the population-centric strategy previously developed, and thus 
did away with geographically oriented small garrisons in favor of large, flexible units and 
built-up camps.21 The response to further guerrilla attacks was massive, brutal, and, 
ultimately, successful but left a stained public legacy, whose character is much debated 
by historians.22  
Essentially, after an initial nod to continuity, a strategy was adopted that did not 
require it, but still met the goals of national policy. Yet, despite the defeat of the 
independence-oriented insurgents, Muslim Moros on the Philippine island of Mindanao 
continued to resist. Captain John J. Pershing, already in the Philippines for two years, was 
placed in charge of the effort to subdue the Moros, and, through a two-year campaign 
during which he alternately wooed tribes and defeated those intent on battle, he proved 
successful. Pershing’s immense effort to acquire intimate knowledge of the Moros in 
order to engage them on their terms gained him great respect throughout the Moro 
population.  
                                                 
20 Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 12, 17, 21–22. 
21 Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 21–27. 
22 Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 27 and Brian McAllister Linn, 
The Philippine War 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 322–23. 
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Interestingly, this seeming commitment to continuity—giving a Philippines-
experienced officer a mission that others with less local knowledge had been unable to 
accomplish—was, in fact, a product of Pershing’s own design. In 1901, Captain 
Pershing’s tour was over, and he only remained in theater by transferring to a unit already 
on its way to the Philippines. This and his subsequent performance helped Pershing gain 
the attention of his superiors.23 By sending Pershing back to the Philippines twice more, 
once as commander of Fort McKinley in 1908 and later as the governor of Moro 
Province for three years, where he succeeded in finally disarming the Moros, the Army 
demonstrated an awareness of the value of local knowledge and continuity.24  
Directly contravening this, however, were policies that frequently rotated units 
and other individuals out of Moro Province. In fact, despite officers being carefully 
selected for specific traits and qualities to serve in long-term governance positions, 
legislation passed in the U.S. Congress required officers to spend four out of every six 
years with a line regiment. The average tour for one of these officers in the Philippines 
was 14 months. Over time, counterproductive actions like these convinced now-General 
Pershing that the Army was an “inappropriate tool for long-term pacification work.”25 
How ironic but revealing that the lack of continuity in U.S. operations convinced a prime 
beneficiary of the positive aspects of continuity that the Army was incapable of 
effectively executing tasks such as counterinsurgency.  
2. Caribbean and Latin America 1898–1934 
The U.S. Marine Corps spent much of the early twentieth century engaged in a 
series of small wars in the Caribbean and Latin America. The Marines quelled civil wars, 
put down rebellions, built host-nation security forces, supervised elections, and 
conducted civil development with varying levels of success. Brigades spent years and 
                                                 
23 Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 61–2, 66–110. 
24 Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, 133, 144–174. 
25 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army 
Center for Military History, 1998), 162–3. 
 12 
decades in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, among other locations.26 
Personnel could serve for years in these units gaining local knowledge and expertise. But, 
frequent changes of command along with lapses in strategic direction, the outbreak of 
World War I and other global commitments, and fluctuating resources often served to 
undermine continuity.27 The 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual that grew out of the 
Marine experiences over the previous half-century cited local knowledge, trust of the 
populace, and detailed intelligence as critical factors, but it did not specifically discuss 
continuity over time.28  
3. World War II 
During World War II, Army Captain Russell Volckmann fought against the 
Japanese as the commander of resistance forces in Northern Luzon in the Philippines.29 
Later, drawing on his experience as a guerrilla leader, then-Colonel Volckmann wrote the 
U.S. Army’s earliest manual for counterinsurgency. First published in 1950 as Special 
Text 31-20-1 Operations Against Guerrilla Forces by the Army’s Infantry Center to meet 
the emerging needs of the Korean War, it was soon released as Field Manual 31-20. This 
doctrinal manual espoused the value of continuity of command, policy, and forces. This 
emerged from Volckmann’s first hand experiences as a guerrilla.  In his dealings with the 
Japanese, Volckmann observed that the disruption and loss of continuity created when 
Japanese units rotated frequently worked to the advantage of his own guerrilla forces. 
Although Japanese units working in Luzon became knowledgeable and gained sufficient 
local expertise to adapt their tactics and nearly destroy the guerrillas, an abrupt rotation of 
forces caused a loss of this knowledge and allowed Volckmann’s resistance forces to 
regroup and reconstitute themselves successfully enough that the new Japanese units 
                                                 
26 Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 178–9, 202, 207, 244, 272, 274, 
302–3, 307, 347 and Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: American Intervention in the Caribbean 1898–
1934 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 130, 154, 159, 212. 
27 Musicant, The Banana Wars, 205, 210–11, 214, 230, 273, 279.  
28Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1940), 1–10 18–19, 1–15 26, 1–30 42–3, 2–3 5. 
29 Mike Guardia, American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann (Philadelphia: 
Casemate, 2010), 101. 
 13 
were incapable of defeating them.30 Continuity, in Volckmann’s view and experience, 
was an “essential” part of any counterinsurgency effort, and abandonment of this 
principle would only aid the insurgent.31 
4. Vietnam 
Unfortunately, the lack of use of this doctrine for the rest of the decade and 
repeated manual revisions, subsumptions, and supersessions diluted some of 
Volckmann’s principles, and, by 1961, Field Manual 31–15 Operations Against 
Irregular Forces stated that continuity to develop in-depth local knowledge was merely 
“desirable.”32 By 1963’s Field Manual 31-23 U.S Army Counterinsurgent Forces, the 
stated principle of continuity in counterinsurgency disappeared completely, replaced 
instead with a new concept that centered on rapidly deployable regionally-oriented 
Special Forces Groups.33 These units grew from an initial design intended to stay behind 
to train and fight alongside guerrillas in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 
As the concept was expanded, it was assumed that these forces’ regional familiarity in 
different parts of the world would function as an acceptable substitute in 
counterinsurgency for knowledge gained in specific areas over time. Within this new 
concept, units were not expected to spend long periods in one place and were instructed 
to pass on incomplete tasks to replacements.34 Given the context this was not necessarily 
an unreasonable concept. But the rapid rise of troop levels in Vietnam quickly outstripped 
the ability of the nascent Special Forces community to supply enough knowledgeable 
individuals.  
                                                 
30 Guardia, American Guerrilla, 160–63, Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
1942–1976 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2006), 130–34 and Department of 
the Army, Special Text 31–20–1 Operations Against Guerrilla Forces (Fort Benning, GA: The Infantry 
School, 1950), 35, 42–43. 
31 Special Text 31–20–1, 42. 
32 Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces (Washington, 
DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1961), 12. 
33 Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (Washington, 
DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1963), 15–16. 
34 Field Manual 31-22, 110. 
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As in the Philippines at the turn of the century and during the Banana Wars after 
that, units were deployed to Vietnam and often remained there. In a general and 
conceptual way, this could even be said to fit with the emphasis on continuity advanced 
by Pershing and Volckmann. The break with theory, however, came with the way forces 
were managed and the lessons the U.S. learned as a consequence of Vietnam.  
To sustain units in Vietnam, the U.S. instituted an individual rotation policy of 
one-year tours. The entire complement of each unit would completely turn over every 
year. This led to poor unit cohesion and discipline problems as the constant, rapid flow of 
individuals prevented stability within the unit.35 Leaders learned from this and, in the 
1980s, instituted a unit rotation policy with the new all-volunteer force. Over the next 20 
years, deployments to Lebanon, the Sinai, and Bosnia adhered to this policy seemingly 
without adverse effects to missions.36 For all practical purposes, Volckmann’s continuity 
of forces concept was abandoned and discussions of continuity in more contemporary 
writings by Galula, Thompson, and Kitson were ignored.  
However, one lesson from Vietnam that was not transmitted, but that was noted in 
a RAND study, relates to institutional memory:  
Another organizational phenomenon with seriously adverse impact on 
U.S. ability to learn and adapt in Vietnam is the shocking lack of 
institutional memory. “We have devised a unique sort of bureaucratic 
machine which . . . tends to ensure that our operation in Vietnam will 
always be vigorous, will never grow tired, but will also never grow wiser.” 
Or, to cite John Vann, “[w]e don’t have twelve years’ experience in 
Vietnam. We have one year’s experience twelve times over.”37 
5. The Recent Past 
Yet, given the nature of the missions over the course of deployments in the 1980s 
and 1990s—short, hot wars in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf as well as 
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peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions in Haiti, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the 
Middle East—the importance of this lesson was not viewed as critical. Only when the 
U.S. found itself embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan did it became evident that longer-
term commitments involving sustained conflict might be required. Already in 2002, the 
U.S. government and leaders were revisiting the individual rotation policy used in 
Vietnam, but the consensus was that “the rotation mistake in Vietnam was individual 
rotation.”38 They believed that unit rotation better increased combat effectiveness.39 
Meanwhile, no mention was made of the time, trust, or knowledge required for the long-
term solutions doctrinally advocated. In fact, recommendations made by the 
Congressional Budget Office about both unit rotations and their duration were dictated by 
the total forces available, the need to stabilize soldiers and families, and the desire to 
strive toward the six-to-twelve month deployment norm that had been established.40 The 
subsequent development of the Army’s Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), which 
had as a primary priority enabling the Army to “[p]revail in protracted counterinsurgency 
campaigns,” dictated an Army “operating on a rotational cycle to provide a sustained 
flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations . . . predictable and 
sustainable for an all-volunteer force.”41 What is seen here is that the U.S. divergence 
from the classic contention that the counterinsurgent should work in an assigned area for 
as long as possible to gain familiarity has been firmly institutionalized. 
B. EFFECTS OF THE ABSENCE OF CONTINUITY42 
Despite the fact that there is now a gap between what the classic theories outline 
and what is practiced (and even written as doctrine), it is generally acknowledged by 
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leaders and the relevant literature that, once the counterinsurgent arrives on the ground 
and receives a hand-off from his predecessor, there is a steep “learning curve” regarding 
knowledge, tactics, and personalities.43 Nonetheless, the means to mitigate this is the 
well-planned and executed unit handover, known as a relief in place. Unfortunately, time, 
trust, and institutional memory, along with other factors, are glossed over and 
unaccounted for by this method.  
The churn in the counterinsurgency environment produced by rotational warfare is 
not only lamented by counterinsurgency theorists and others, but is readily acknowledged 
by senior commanders. General David Petraeus, then the commander of U.S. Central 
Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee in 2010. 
Representative Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) posed a question as to why the U.S. was not 
able to adapt and learn from mistakes identifying and fighting insurgents over the years 
spent in Afghanistan. General Petraeus responded that “to a degree . . . we fought 
Afghanistan for seven years in one year increments.”44 Notably, he did not make this 
statement in the context of seeking any basic change in how the U.S. fights long wars, but 
instead intended to support for his point that counterinsurgency is a “local war” that 
requires “granular understanding” of all aspects of the environment.45 His aim in this 
forum, speaking to the holders of the purse strings, was to elicit more resources in order 
to better build that understanding.  
General Petraeus’s comments are worth illustrating because they do not just 
illustrate, but highlight the disconnect between counterinsurgency theory and its actual 
practice. General Petraeus’ comments echo those of John Paul Vann in his condemnation 
of the individual replacement system during Vietnam. But while General Petraeus 
focused on one reality of the battlefield and one lesson learned, he did not make Vann’s 
leap in tracing the problem to its source: the method we utilize to rotate forces in and out 
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of combat. This has effects at the tactical level, to be sure. But it also extends to the 
operational and strategic efforts of establishing or reforming governance and addressing 
the population’s grievances that generate support for the insurgency in the first place. 
Take, for example, a popular technique employed as a long-term effort in this 
vein. The counterinsurgent undertakes a widespread school-building program. This 
program offers a number of benefits. In the short-term, it shows members of the local 
population that the counterinsurgent force cares about their future, and not just about 
defeating the insurgents. It provides activities for young people and employment for 
adults who could otherwise be influenced by the insurgency. As the school-building 
program progresses, additional projects are undertaken in the name of or in partnership 
with the government, adding legitimacy and building goodwill toward it. Over time, the 
education level of the population is raised, increasing the likelihood that locals will 
participate in the governing process rather than being suborned by those who wish to 
violently induce change from outside that process.  
Admittedly, all of these benefits are theoretical, hard to quantify, and there is 
heated debate as to whether school-building or similar techniques work at all. However, 
any such discussions mask the fundamental issue that should be debated: if, after years, 
multiple force rotations, and the inevitable loss of information due to unit, personnel, and 
equipment transfers, not a single counterinsurgent knows the purpose for which the 
school was built, how can its effectiveness be judged? Unfortunately, this is the situation 
that results all too often from many of the endeavors undertaken. Theory is put into 
practice, but the examination of its effects are lost in the churn of the rotational war and 
the constant effort to do something, anything about a problem that does not seem to be 
going away.  
In a related effect that exploits the breakdowns in oversight during frequent 
personnel rotations, numerous examples of corruption in the disbursement of funds and 
awarding of contracts by U.S. military personnel to locals in Iraq and Afghanistan 
abound. While multiple prosecutions and convictions of some of the perpetrators have 
occurred, undoubtedly the number of actual crimes is greater. The same problems that 
allow a school to languish unnoticed a short time after being built account for these other 
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failures. At the same time, while instances of corruption in the counterinsurgent force 
undermine the usefulness of “money as a weapons system” to help address the 
population’s underlying grievances, a larger problem is that this also undermines the 
counterinsurgent’s narrative.46 The loss of credibility is two-fold. Domestic support of 
the government and popular opinion at home are critical to any war-fighting effort; 
breaches of trust directly erode this support. In the same manner, an erosion of trust 
between the local populace and government casts a pall over all other efforts the 
counterinsurgent undertakes.  
Essentially, churn promoted by the constant rotation of units creates a cascade of 
problems. Well-intentioned programs are lost in the shuffle and local opportunists try to 
capitalize on the fact that headquarters turn over to steal money. One might argue that 
issues such as these could be resolved with better supervision, better training, and better 
technology and knowledge management during the relief in place process. If better 
technical systems were built, the opportunities for failure would be reduced. Technology 
could allow a unit to begin mitigating these failures before it even deploys. The problem 
with such technological fixes, however, is that they treat symptoms, not the structural 
flaws in the model of rotational war.  
To illustrate this, consider another lesson from Vietnam. In addition to the 
individual rotation policy, leaders were rotated through command positions frequently, as 
often as every six months.47 The crucible of combat experience had to be spread around 
to increase the overall effectiveness of the force and officers needed command experience 
in combat to get promoted. This led to inexperienced commanders commanding and a 
loss of unit cohesion.48 This problem was acknowledged after Vietnam. The lesson that 
officer corps careerism and ticket-punching had led to decreased operational 
effectiveness and increased casualties was learned and the problem remedied. Two-year 
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command tours became the standard.49 The aim was no longer to spread experience 
around. If a deployment rotation happened during a commander’s tour, fine. If his 
command tour ended during a rotation, no problem, he would change command. Yet the 
unforeseen consequence of this in Iraq and Afghanistan was that even one change in 
commanders could be problematic. To change a commander during an operational 
deployment was seen to degrade operational effectiveness.50 The two-year rule was thus 
relaxed with the advent of unit-focused stabilization and the ARFORGEN cycle. 
Commanders would finish the deployment with the units they had trained and fought 
with, even if their time in command exceeded the two-year policy.51 Careerism was held 
at bay. But, while these reforms were certainly well-intentioned, they ignored the 
fundamental effect of rotating units on the institutional career model.  
Currently, a command tour under the unit rotational model usually translates to 
one combat deployment during a commander’s tenure. Promotion boards and command 
boards understandably promote and give the responsibility of further command to 
combat-proven, effective leaders. Combat experience during command is valued more 
than is service in a staff or support role. This means a commander has one shot to prove 
himself. That shot will effectively determine whether his promotion to higher rank and 
selection for further command are secure. In other words, a commander’s fate is 
inextricably tied to the perception of his performance and that of his unit during their tour 
in combat. This reality, in turn, incentivizes two behaviors that run counter to any efforts 
to maintain systemic continuity amid unit rotations. These behaviors are influenced by 
what has been described as the visibility theory of promotion: the more an individual is in 
a position to be seen, the greater his chances of advancement.52 Consequently, to increase 
the appearance of effectiveness and to excel, a commander cannot do the exact same 
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things, let alone continue the policies of his predecessors or his peers. He must stand out. 
He must do something different. In short, continuity loses out to the need to appear 
effective.  
Second, when it comes to the perception of being effective, “perception” is the 
operative word. Take the benefits of the school-building program described earlier. Is 
such a program effective? Can effectiveness even be measured at the end of 15 months, 
let alone six months? It seems self-evident that the relatively brief period available to 
those who are evaluating performance hardly grants them sufficient time to understand 
the effects of whatever techniques a commander employs. If a commander conducts 
operations that build three local security force units, yield hundreds of confiscated 
weapons, and destroy two local insurgent networks, are those operations effective over 
time? Is a single tour-length sufficient to determine this? From Robert Thompson’s 
comments relayed earlier, it is clear he would say “no.” 
If effectiveness cannot be determined over the length of a tour, but a commander 
is judged based on that tour, the long-term effects of the techniques he employs must be 
assumed to be successful or at least portrayed as such in order for him to be judged a 
success and continue on his career path. Actual continuity in the counterinsurgency effort 
is thereby sacrificed to perceptions; effectiveness is rendered irrelevant. Under this 
system, not only is the success of a counterinsurgent technique or effort dictated by 
perceptions of success at the end of a single tour, but the cycle is then repeated as units 
rotate out and new headquarters come in and wipe the slate clean.  
This problem is compounded by turbulence at all levels of command at different 
times. If a tactical-level commander is unable to determine effectively the long-term 
effects of the operations and counterinsurgent techniques he employs, how can an 
operational or strategic-level commander identify success, let alone reinforce it, allow it 
to develop, and then adapt those same techniques to other areas of his command? How 
can unsuccessful techniques be identified and eliminated? If a higher-level commander 
does not have purview over multiple units responsible for the same tasks in the same 
areas over time, how can he judge the effectiveness of those units and give guidance to 
those replacing them or even his own replacement? Compounding the problem, again, is 
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that the rotational system that guarantees discontinuity makes it extremely difficult to 
discern successful techniques from those that merely appear successful. 
Any solution designed to improve the utilization of forces to prosecute a 
counterinsurgency must somehow remedy the challenge of maintaining continuity. The 
local knowledge and experience gained on the ground are key factors in such a fight. 
Gaining the trust of the population helps acquire intelligence and secure support against 
the insurgents. Building the “granular understanding” about the locality creates the ability 
to distinguish the insurgent from the population. Personal relationships are a necessary 
component, and those come only with time. 
Part of the problem with highlighting and addressing these concerns is a 
fundamental belief in the military that units and people are interchangeable. It is a basic 
principle of professional modern militaries that units are held to uniform standards to 
ensure that capabilities are equal across the force in order to guarantee that planners can 
effectively apply manpower and forces against requirements. This principle is the 
foundation for the policies and procedures that govern the management and application of 
forces. Rotational warfare is possible only in so far as all units are the same. For all 
intents and purposes, this means that the concept of interchangeability not only masks but 
trumps any problems resulting from the lack of attention to continuity. Such problems are 
viewed as the costs of doing business. But, according to Frank Kitson, in 
counterinsurgency, continuity is at the heart of the business.53 Thus the underlying 
assumption of interchangeability is worth a second look.  
                                                 
53  Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 131. 
 22 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 23 
IV. INTERCHANGEABILITY: THE ENEMY OF CONTINUITY 
An underlying assumption necessary in the U.S. method of force rotation is that 
the units asked to conduct missions are interchangeable. Given recent U.S. experiences in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, a relevant question arises: is this assumption of interchangeability 
valid in a counterinsurgency environment? There are opposing views on this subject, but, 
by using this rotational method, the U.S. military presumes the validity of this 
assumption. Critics argue that the specialized nature of counterinsurgency requires 
specialized forces to instead.54 Yet, a mean between the two may not only be achievable, 
but is actually necessary. The argument to be made in this chapter is that with time, 
training, and experience, interchangeable units can be adapted to execute 
counterinsurgency operations. If continuity is not maintained, however, that adaptation is 
wasted, and the process must begin again with a new unit. Specialized knowledge and 
adaptive techniques are as important as the critics contend, but, so is maintaining 
continuity and experience. 
A. INTERCHANGEABILITY IN THEORY 
According to both current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and many historical 
theorists, infantry forces with mobility assets employed in a flexible role are an essential 
core capability in any counterinsurgency effort.55 However, at any point during 
operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, a drive down a main supply route would have revealed 
the presence of numerous different types of units performing dismounted or motorized 
ground tasks. A few months earlier or later, a completely different set of units would 
have occupied that same space.  
During conflicts in which the strategy required large numbers of ground troops, 
there simply were not enough infantry forces to fill the void. The exigencies of war, troop 
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strain, and the lack of a widespread need for heavy forces and artillery combined to create 
an opportunity. Artillery battalions, cavalry squadrons, and armor units were employed in 
what would traditionally be considered infantry roles and conducted counterinsurgency 
interchangeably with infantry units. It could be argued that one combat battalion, be it 
mounted, motorized, armored, mechanized, or airborne, was considered to be as good as 
another, and all were capable of performing the same role.  
The generalist officer model and the concept of individual interchangeability 
(“everyone is a soldier first”) lend theoretical support to the idea that these units could 
perform equally well. Yet, as American strategists like Edward Luttwak point out, none 
of these forces, not even the infantry, are adequate in counterinsurgency. Their very 
nature as attrition-focused, highly standardized units is not applicable to the area-specific 
methods that are required in counterinsurgencies.56 In Luttwak’s view, interchangeability 
is the antithesis of counterinsurgency. Luttwak argues that U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) are the most appropriate force given the existing U.S. structure for waging 
a counterinsurgency.57 The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, where the lack 
of local security forces, the absence of governance, and deep rifts within the population 
necessitated a much larger nation-building effort than SOF could shoulder, did not really 
permit exclusive use of SOF.58 
The standardized military occupational specialty (MOS) system for enlisted 
soldiers creates a system akin to the concept of the assembly line and interchangeable 
parts.59 The Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks dictates a baseline set of combat skills 
for all soldiers.60 The Non-Commissioned Officer Education System then takes these 
baseline skills and develops them into the professional backbone of the Army. In theory, 
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with these baseline skills instilled in every enlisted soldier, a mechanized infantryman 
without his vehicle, a tank crewman without his tank, or an artilleryman without his 
howitzer should be just as useful in a counterinsurgency environment as an infantryman 
since none of them are specially trained for counterinsurgency. 
The generalist model for military officers was laid out in the Officer Personnel 
Act of 1947 and finalized in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 
during the Army’s post-Vietnam professionalization. Career paths were standardized, the 
size of the officer corps was regulated, and generalists were ensconced as a permanent 
normative fixture in the military.61 When combined with standardized professional 
military education, the product was senior leaders with general knowledge across the 
force, not just in their personal career path. This has meant that each officer begins in a 
specialized branch and, as his training and experience broaden his knowledge base, 
becomes a generalist over time.62 An artillery battalion commander should therefore have 
the same foundational knowledge as an infantry battalion commander for a task that 
neither of them is specifically trained for, like counterinsurgency. The advent of the 
modular Brigade Combat Team reinforced this concept. In this structure, officers can 
learn one specialty early in their career and later be given combat-arms immaterial 
commands or staff positions in units with a completely different specialty. Infantry or 
armor officers can command cavalry squadrons in Brigade Combat Teams, for instance.  
B. INTERCHANGEABILITY IN PRACTICE 
The combination of these enlisted and officer processes provides the basis for 
employing different types of units interchangeably. But—how efficacious is this for 
counterinsurgency? To answer that, we can compare the experiences of two battalion-
sized units, one infantry and one cavalry, that faced similar situations in Iraq. Such a 
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comparison partially validates the concept of interchangeability, but also highlights 
certain inadequacies.  
Journalist David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers recounts the 15-month long 
deployment of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Ralph Kauzlarich’s 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry 
Regiment (2–16) in the Shiite-dominated Rustamiyah area of Baghdad during 2007–
2008. In a white paper written for the Center for a New American Security, LTC Jim 
Crider outlines his own lessons learned as squadron commander of the 1st Squadron, 4th 
Cavalry Regiment (1–4) operating in the predominantly Sunni Doura area of Baghdad 
during the same period. The initial experiences of both units were virtually 
indistinguishable. They both admitted to a lack of understanding about the enemy they 
were facing, which generated almost identical questions as to why the people they were 
trying to help were fighting them.63 Their units made mistakes, utilized ineffective 
tactics, and suffered from a lack of intelligence and overall direction. As time progressed, 
they gained some local knowledge, saw what was working and what was not, and 
changed their methods, each adopting specific tactics adapted for their areas.64 In my 
experience, this was a very common path for units to take during their tours in Iraq, 
leading to the key question: were they successful? Furthermore, was one more successful 
than the other?  
While these two accounts are far from conclusive, the words of the commanders 
seem to speak for themselves. LTC Ralph Kauzlarich felt that despite the 2nd Battalion’s 
efforts, there was “still that underlying negativity towards the U.S. that would not allow 
[2nd Battalion] to reach [its] full potential.”65 LTC Crider, however, saw that “violence 
in the [1st Squadron’s] Doura neighborhood had dropped to levels unimaginable the 
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previous summer.”66 At least in the eyes of the respective commanders, it seems the 
cavalry squadron was more successful that the infantry battalion.67  
Many factors could account for different self-assessments: individual and unit 
experience, training, the local populace, and the environment among others. On the 
whole, however, the very different appraisals by these two commanders about their own 
effectiveness reveal that, while the concept of interchangeability between different types 
of combat units may not be inherently flawed, it does leave critical issues under-
addressed. For instance, under current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, a detailed 
handover from the previous unit would have been essential for the unit to properly 
understand and adapt to their environment.68 No mention is made of any effort to ensure 
continuity by previous units, and the lack of knowledge both commanders said they had 
about the area indicates that very little knowledge had been transmitted. Even had both 
2–16 and 1–4 been given new sectors of responsibility, without taking over from a unit of 
comparable size, those new sectors would have had to be carved from a previous or 
existing unit’s larger area. Presumably, that previous unit would have had at least some 
knowledge of the area, and should have had a trove of information to hand over covering 
the period from 2003 to 2007 regarding past operations, the populace, what methods had 
been tried in the past, to include, at a minimum, information about the enemy. 
Unfortunately, that presumption rarely reflects reality. 
As an officer who spent months during 2003–2004 in the Doura district of 
Baghdad, the area assigned to 1–4 four years later, I found it painful to read Crider’s 
account about conducting a census, getting to know local leaders and power brokers, and 
executing fruitless cordon and search operations. My unit and others had conducted 
similar efforts, but the lack of continuity between units and headquarters led to a 
complete absence of institutional knowledge about the area. This illuminates a severe 
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weakness in the practice of transitioning between units in a counterinsurgency. While the 
generalist officer model and the military’s need to treat individuals and units as 
interchangeable underscore the significance of the inter- in interchangeability, the current 
inattention to prior experience and the need to ensure continuity demand a rethinking of 
what should be meant by the -change- in interchangeability.  
One relevant example illustrates the value to be gained from attention to the 
significance of continuity. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) was given 
responsibility for the Ninewah province of Iraq in 2005, including the insurgent-held city 
of Tal Afar.69 This 15-month long effort has largely been hailed as a counterinsurgency 
success and is cited as a model to strive for in the U.S. Army’s manual on 
counterinsurgency.70 The 3rd ACR did not seem to go through the months-long fits and 
starts of poor intelligence, tried and failed tactics, and lack of understanding of its 
environment that characterized the tours of the two battalions in Baghdad. And, of further 
note, this was an armored cavalry regiment with tanks and fighting vehicles, not a 
specialized counterinsurgent force with an abundance of dismounted troops. So, what 
accounts for the difference here?  
A number of factors differentiate the 3rd ACR’s experience from that of the other 
two units. First, the 3rd ACR was less than a year out from its previous deployment to 
Iraq fighting insurgents in adjoining Al Anbar province. This provided it with experience 
and institutional memory.71 Second, its new commander, then-Colonel H.R. McMaster 
had seen the insurgency from the crow’s nest of Central Command and had read 
extensively on counterinsurgency theory, requiring his staff and subordinate leaders to do 
the same.72 This contributed experience and training, albeit academic, to the equation. 
Finally, elements of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) assisted the planning and 
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execution of 3rd ACR’s operations with knowledge gained from 5th SFG (A)’s time on 
the ground in the local area, contributing localized expertise and some continuity from 
past operations.73  
Experience, training, local knowledge, and continuity, all things that the 1–4 and 
2–16 lacked, enabled the 3rd ACR to develop and employ successful methods in Tal 
Afar. While this does lend credence to idea that the 3rd ACR could substitute—and 
hereby was interchangeable—for a formation that is more widely regarded as a better 
force for conducting counterinsurgency—namely the infantry—it more strongly suggests 
that specialized knowledge and continuity can help units become more capable in a 
counterinsurgency environment and that units with these tools will do better than units 
without them. 
Meanwhile, if we dig deeper into LTC Crider’s area of responsibility, the Doura 
sector in the East Rashid District of Baghdad, there are more things to note regarding 
continuity. Over time, efforts in the area were deemed successful. Once the level of 
violence dropped, what had once been called a “Sunni insurgent stronghold” underwent a 
positive transformation and rebirth of its large market area.74 Efforts made by LTC 
Crider’s squadron, as well as those made by units responsible for other parts of the 
district during the surge in Iraq, can be viewed as a turning point that allowed later units 
to build on this initial success. Numerous different types of units over the years were 
assigned to the Doura area, both before and after 1–4. Light infantry, Stryker armored 
vehicle, tank, light and heavy cavalry, and combined arms battalion-sized units all 
conducted operations there during the war.75 In the aggregate, the long-term 
improvement in the area would again seem to validate the idea that units with different 
skill sets can adapt and succeed in counterinsurgency. Looking more closely, however, 
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some units received no handover or experienced abbreviated transitions.76 Some units 
received mission changes after weeks or months in country and arrived and then departed 
an area quickly.77  
A unit that moves from one area of responsibility to another numerous times in 
the first months of its rotation can hardly be expected to gain, maintain, or pass on 
intimate local knowledge to the units replacing it. In some cases, priorities would change 
immediately after the unit changeover.78 New relationships with the local populace and 
units would be established while others were abandoned.79 At one point, responsibility 
was turned over to Iraqi forces, only later to be retracted.80 Frequent changes like these 
run counter to any long-term effort toward stability. While the Doura area was eventually 
viewed as a success, the repeated push and pull of progress resulting from the lack of 
continuity unnecessarily prolonged the achievement of that success. 
C. THE CHALLENGES OF INCORPORATING CONTINUITY 
Admittedly, campaign planning in counterinsurgency is difficult by its very 
nature. Security conditions, policy, and strategy all progressively develop and change. 
For planners, anticipation of such changes is problematic. The current solution is to press 
ahead with interchangeability. If units are interchangeable, this provides flexibility so that 
strategy can be adapted and forces can be deployed or shifted, based on emerging 
situations. This reactive method of problem solving, however, is hardly ideal. In the case 
of the Doura sector, the area progressed then regressed until it became so bad it required 
significantly more attention before it could improve again. An alternative method would 
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be to instead devise a framework that is proactive and preventative. For any such 
initiative the key element is continuity.  
Cumulative experience and knowledge about past operations undertaken by units 
in specific areas are essential to being able to plan for and anticipate future conditions. 
Current doctrine seems to assume only limited knowledge about the past, with planned 
long-range operations to be limited to three months’ worth of effects after a unit’s 
rotation ends.81 This planning horizon is inadequate, even at the tactical level, for any 
operation that is expected to contribute to stability over the span of multiple years. For 
instance, it should not have been unreasonable for LTC Crider to expect to receive four 
years’ worth of information about past operations, the population, the enemy, as well as 
detailed dossiers on local political and religious leaders, along with a prioritized list of 
long-term goals for his area. Military leaders with experience might scoff at such a 
notion, since plans will always change. However, when units come into an area, stay for a 
few weeks or months, and then shift to other areas of responsibility, the situation 
eventually comes to resemble the childhood game of telephone. Information is invariably 
garbled, altered, or lost.  
In the digital age, it can be argued that detailed records should be easy to maintain 
and transmit and should minimize this type of data loss. However, without continuity of 
effort, changing priorities will dictate what is momentarily important and, thus, what 
records will be kept. Shifting responsibility for a single area between organizations also 
means that report formats, frequency of reporting, and content itself can differ 
significantly, especially if different organizations cover the same geographical area and 
population. This limits the ease of use as well as the utility of saved records. Not 
surprisingly, any records turned over to a new unit, which the military refers to as a 
‘continuity’ file, will often be limited to the transitioning unit’s own experience. This 
points to yet another way in which nothing is as interchangeable as is presumed.  
Efforts to maintain continuity of units and personnel in counterinsurgency are 
difficult. The U.S. military has the resources and ability to frequently rotate units. The 
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negative effects of combat on units and individuals prompt leaders to keep rotations as 
short as possible while still being effective. 
While the challenges inherent in the idea of unit interchangeability did not prevent 
success in the Doura area, Edward Luttwak’s attention to specialized knowledge and 
methods deserves a closer look. As he acknowledges, interchangeable, templated, 
professional tools and structures of war are essential to waging conventional campaigns 
on a large scale, but those same tools are not immediately applicable in a 
counterinsurgency environment. In that kind of environment, time, local knowledge, and 
experience are needed.  Waging counterinsurgency requires that organizations, methods, 
tactics, techniques, procedures, and even weapons have to be adapted. What works in one 
location is not necessarily interchangeable with what has been developed in another area. 
Valuable time and progress can be lost when this is ignored. While the principle of 
continuity has had prominent proponents like Pershing, Volckmann, and Vann, the best 
examples of how continuity can be balanced with the principle of interchangeability can 
be found abroad. 
 33 
V. THE BRITISH EXAMPLE 
A. CONTINUITY IN BRITISH DOCTRINE 
Perhaps thanks to lessons learned during its imperial past, current British 
counterinsurgency doctrine features the concept of continuity in a fairly prominent 
position in The Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10: Countering Insurgency. In the first 
section of the first chapter, continuity is detailed as a fundamental element. Continuity in 
planning, command, personnel, and the assigning of a specific area for the duration of a 
unit’s tour are viewed as essential to maintaining a consistent strategy, developing trust 
and building relationships with the local populace and government, and developing 
intelligence over time.82 All are considered key to establishing security, without which 
government reforms, civil development, and redress of underlying grievances cannot be 
accomplished. 
British guidelines for implementing these measures recommend “purpose-
designed, standing” headquarters, manned on the basis of individual rotations with tours 
of duty to be as long as possible and practicable. Tours of duty are also to be staggered to 
prevent mass hemorrhaging of institutional memory.83 In other words, the British have 
devised an individual replacement system that does not require individuals to have to 
spend 10 years engaged in conflict, but also does not continually reinvent the wheel. For 
example, say a commander comes into a conflict zone for a three-year tour at an 
operational headquarters. Prior to taking command he has undergone language, 
counterinsurgency, and area-specific training to prepare him for this assignment. Once he 
is on the ground, his deputy and chief of staff have already done one or two years in their 
job in that specific area. Consequently, experience and local knowledge can be 
maintained, as can institutional memory, so long as the rotation system is properly 
managed.  
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Interestingly, the British manual highlights another benefit of continuity. In 
addition to demonstrating to the host nation government that commitment is real, 
continuity reinforces the principle that “the long term solution to an insurgency rests with 
the host nation, its government and its people.”84 On its face, this might seem 
counterintuitive, since it would be natural to assume that keeping units and individuals in 
place for long periods could leave local nationals with the impression that they are 
incapable of solving their problems on their own and must have their hands held for the 
foreseeable future. However, consider the psychological effect of consistently rotating 
forces for short durations. Say you are a local national in a country with serious security 
problems. Annually or semi-annually comes another foreign commander, unit, or soldier 
to outline the way things are going to be from now on. The pitch you are given may or 
not be the same pitch given by the last foreigner or set of foreigners with consistent goals, 
but this new individual or group certainly will not know about the previous promises 
made or conversations conducted, let alone be a party to the trust established.  
Under the British model in the same situation, in contrast, everyone is not new at 
the same time.  There will be members of the command team who have been on the 
ground for one or two years and have been privy to most of the conversations and 
promises made and can share their knowledge. For the local nationals, this continuity 
helps preserve a common vision regarding goals and the paths to reach them.  
British doctrine also stresses the importance of continuity in messaging across 
forces, continuity among approaches over time, continuity of relationships, and 
continuity of the forces to be employed in influence operations. All of this grows out of 
the prior experiences of the British. 
B. MALAYA 
In 1948, the British colony of Malaya had a rising communist insurgency centered 
among the significant minority ethnic Chinese population (38 percent). A state of 
emergency was declared soon after the killing of three British planters in a communist-
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backed attack in June 1948, and on the heels of rising communist-initiated violence.85 
The British were faced with general antipathy in a population demoralized over the 
previous six years, given the British retreat from Malaya and capitulation of Singapore to 
the Japanese, a harsh Japanese occupation, the British resumption of control after the 
Japanese abandoned Malaya, ineffective and counterproductive post-war policies, and 
corrupt administration officials. Economic practices that favored the British government 
and businesses, low wages, the high cost of living (especially of rice), a rise in crime, and 
policies that advantaged ethnic Malays with the establishment of the new Federation of 
Malaya government all engendered disaffection among ethnic Chinese, other minorities, 
and the population at large.86 The Malaysian Communist Party proved an attractive 
alternative.  It served as an advocate for the alienated Chinese Malayan population.  It 
also had cachet thanks to association with the Chinese Communist Party and to the 
communist Malaysian People’s Anti-Japanese Army’s role as the sole resistance 
organization throughout the Japanese occupation. Additionally, it had significant 
presence in Malaya’s trade unions.87 
Despite British jungle experience in the Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters 
in World War II, the strategy of Major General Charles Bouchet, the British commander 
in Malaya, relied on large sweeps by the military with a conventional World War II 
mindset that were drawn from his experiences in North Africa and Europe. The police 
force, populated by ethnically Malay officers and British officials with little local 
experience, proved to be inept and the government had minimal presence in ethnically 
Chinese areas. With political turmoil in the administration, the military and police 
struggled for control of the state response to the communist insurgency. These factors all 
resulted in an ineffective fight through the end of the 1940s against communist insurgents 
that only further alienated members of the Chinese Malayan community.88  
                                                 
85 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12, 67. 
86 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 10–38. 
87 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 42–62. 
88 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 62–93. 
 36 
By 1950, an in-depth review indicated that the British strategy was not working. 
Over the next 10 years, British and Malayan forces, both civil and military, developed, 
implemented, and continually adapted and improved a strategy that separated the 
insurgents from the population and enabled government victory. With the booming 
rubber and tin markets brought on by the Korean War, the government could afford a 
program of Chinese Malay resettlement and civil reforms. Food denial operations and 
eventual independence cut the insurgency off from its support base for resources and 
recruits. Continual improvements in police and military command and control, 
professionalization, tactics, and effective unit employment enabled security forces to 
drive insurgents out of their safe havens and whittle the insurgency down to a level 
incapable of threatening government power.89 The government’s strategy evolved and 
required numerous policy adjustments and changes to operational methods as deficiencies 
were identified. The Brit’s commitment to establishing continuity assisted in this process 
and contributed to the development of a successful strategy. 
Chief among the factors related to continuity was the British policy of two-year 
tours for commanders and staffs at the headquarters level. This enabled commanders to 
revise, then implement the strategy first developed by Director of Operations Lieutenant 
General Harold Briggs in 1950. It also enabled them to evaluate their effectiveness over a 
sufficient period of time and recommend refinements to their successors. When General 
Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner in Malaya in 1952, he was 
granted unified command over both military and civil forces. Briggs recommended this, 
since without it the Briggs plan would not have been able to make any progress. 
Templer’s additions to and enhancements of Briggs’s strategy, such as establishment of 
executive committees to meet frequently at all levels to manage the war in an integrated 
manner, contributed to progress and were continued and further refined by his successor, 
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Sir Donald MacGillivray, who had already served two years as Deputy High 
Commissioner.90 
While the conditions of employment for staff and civil service personnel initially 
discouraged people from staying in Malaya, the continuous development of the strategy 
and its eventual success would have been impossible without ideas and efforts spawned 
by individuals with years of experience in Malaya who continued to serve throughout the 
Emergency. For instance, Richard Noone worked in Malaya before, during, and after 
World War II as an anthropologist and an intelligence officer, and eventually became the 
head of the Department of Aborigines. He was instrumental in denying the insurgency the 
support of the mountain tribes and forming an anti-guerrilla force that still exists in 
Malaysia as an elite police special operations unit.91 Sir John Davis, a Special Branch 
police officer in Malaya in the 1930s, was similarly important. A veteran member of the 
Special Operations Executive in Malaya during World War II, Davis later commanded 
the first counter-insurgent force in the Emergency which in turn developed tactics used to 
train all British military forces in Malaya. During the height of the Emergency, Davis 
served as the British liaison officer to the ethnic Chinese Malayan resettlement program 
and made key improvements that ensured the success of the project. He remained until 
1960.92  
Retired British Major General E.B. de Fonblonque was another individual who 
spent years in Malaya.  He first served as the Assistant Commissioner of Civil Defence 
and was then appointed Inspector General of the Home Guard (trained militias charged 
with protecting their local areas). From 1952–1958 he made significant improvements in 
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the organization and administration of this key ground-level security apparatus.93 M.C.ff. 
Sheppard, a British national in the Malayan civil service in the 1930s, was not only a 
veteran of World War II, but had been held as a prisoner of war by the Japanese. As a 
British Advisor in the Civil Service, he served as a cultural advisor to the 
counterinsurgency effort and developed a key component of the food denial program.94 
Through individuals like these, continuity was maintained not just in the security 
apparatus but throughout the administration. 
Continuity within the military forces was also vital. In addition to the Home 
Guard and Malayan units that worked in their home areas and had extensive local 
knowledge, extended tour lengths of two to three years gave British Army units the 
ability to build institutional memory and develop tactics that were tailored to specific 
areas.95 The British personnel system, however, dictated that only between five and 10 
percent of the formation would serve in Malaya for the entire three years (40 to 80 
soldiers in an 800-man battalion).96 And though this may seem a small number, if every 
U.S. platoon in Iraq or Afghanistan had three to seven individuals each with between two 
and three years of relevant continuous experience in the local area, along with an even 
larger number with one to two years, the state of affairs in both countries might be 
significantly different.  
The six Ghurka battalions of the British forces, meanwhile, were deployed to 
Malaya throughout the entire Emergency. The practice of establishing designated sectors 
for each unit whenever possible enabled all of these units to develop localized tactics and 
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solutions that increased effectiveness.97 Lessons, tactics, and local knowledge in jungle 
warfare were imparted to all incoming officers and NCOs during two months of training 
at the Far East Land Forces Training Center, and those leaders, in turn, trained their units 
prior to operations.98 A pamphlet titled The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in 
Malaya was disseminated to all forces to ensure valuable lessons and tactics were 
transferred between units and it helped units adjust when they were moved from one area 
to another.99 The designation of Special Branch as the lead for intelligence operations 
likewise meant continuity of analysis, which led to more focus operations over time.100  
While each of these practices on its own did not ensure continuity, taken as a 
whole, it is apparent that here was a system that valued and tried to preserve institutional 
memory. In sum, we can say that attention to continuity in command, administrative, and 
security service roles throughout the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya aided in 
the development, refinement, and prosecution of strategy that effectively defeated the 
communist insurgency. 
C. OMAN 
The British experience in Oman during the 1970s was fundamentally different 
from that in Malaya and elsewhere. Oman had not been a British colony and large 
numbers of British front-line troops were not engaged in actual fighting. Rebellious 
mountain tribes dissatisfied with their ruler, Sultan Said, and the lack of development 
were a consistently resurgent problem throughout the 1950s and 1960s. With British 
assistance, the Sultan’s Armed Forces were created and conducted repeated campaigns 
with British forces against rebels who threatened the central government.101 The 
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establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1968 to Oman’s 
southwest, however, changed the character of what had been a discontinuous small 
nationalist rebellion and transformed it into a threatening insurgency under the auspices 
of a new communist organization, the People’s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 
Arab Gulf.102 Aided by communists from the west, resistance against the policies and 
corruption of the Sultan grew, especially in the province of Dhofar.103 Given the Sultan’s 
lack of an effective counterinsurgency strategy and unresponsiveness to the population, 
his son Qaboos saw an opportunity for his country and himself.104 He solicited British 
help in gaining control of the country. This proved an attractive offer.  After all, he was a 
Sandhurst graduate. Couple that with the rising threat of communism in the region and 
Oman’s strategic access to the Persian Gulf, and in 1970 the British lent him their 
support. Qaboos successfully orchestrated a coup against his father and sent him into 
exile.105 Appealing to both his neighbors and the British government for aid to combat 
the insurgency, Qaboos received military assistance from the United Kingdom, Jordan, 
Iran, India and Baluchistan, a province of Pakistan with ethnic ties to Oman.106  
Along with his British advisors, Qaboos developed a strategy comprised of civil 
development, governmental reforms, and an amnesty program to redress grievances and 
separate the insurgents from the populace.107 The plan also included an expansion and 
professionalization of the military with British commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers (NCO) either on loan from the British Army and Royal Marines or contracted 
from former British personnel serving in command, advisory, and training roles 
throughout the Sultan’s Armed Forces.108 The Commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces 
oversaw forces of all nationalities and services in Oman, and the Dhofar brigade 
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commander was given charge of all forces in Dhofar province, ensuring a unity of 
effort.109 A program for recruiting and employing  firqats, small militias of tribal 
members and surrendered enemy personnel run by the British 22nd Special Air Service, 
provided specific ground level knowledge about their home areas. Civil Action Teams of 
SAS personnel and the Civil Aid Department conducted development and humanitarian 
operations designed to gain the population’s trust and cooperation. Thanks to a combined 
effort of civil and military action, along with government reform, the insurgency was 
defeated by 1975.110  
Continuity was critical to this success. At the headquarters level, command and 
staff tours of two years provided leaders time to implement Qaboos’s counterinsurgency 
strategy, assess its effects, and recommend improvements to successors, who then had 
experienced subordinates available to implement any needed changes. The consistent 
presence of an effective, dedicated local reformer who also possessed authority and 
dedication to the specific problem—Sultan Qaboos—was also key (this may have been 
even more important in Oman than in places where the British exerted more control, as in 
the former colonies).111 Also important were long-serving personnel like Martin Robb, a 
former contract officer with the Sultan’s Armed Forces who later headed the Civil Aid 
Department: he represented continuity on both the military and development fronts.112 As 
in Malaya, here too committee meetings incorporating all departments involved in the 
counterinsurgency effort were held weekly to continually assess the strategy, evaluate 
progress, and recommend adjustments.113 
At the lower level, British officers and NCOs led the operational units. While the 
serving officers did not have extended tour lengths, the units they led moved into and out 
of the same areas repeatedly on nine-month rotations. Half of the British advisors, 
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however, were contracted directly by the Sultan. Often, these were former British 
military personnel who had served in Oman and then stayed on. They remained important 
advisors, constituting the institutional memory for the Sultan’s Armed Forces. Serving 
British officers were, at times, seconded by or to one of these long-serving contract 
personnel. This mix of seasoned contract and serving officers as commanders, deputies, 
and subordinates created continuity of experience within the front-line leadership that 
would not have been present otherwise. Other measures to help bridge the continuity gap 
included language and area-specific training as well as a month-long area familiarization 
period in Dhofar itself for British officers.114  
As to the SAS and the firqats, while these militias themselves changed over time 
and the specific SAS squadron advisors would rotate, the small size and dedication to 
institutional memory of the SAS itself ensured that local knowledge was passed 
effectively and that the campaign plan outlined for their operations in 1970 was executed 
and continuously refined throughout the war.115 
In sum, continuity facilitated the design, application, and refinement of a specific 
plan over five years. Continuity at subordinate levels contributed to the success of the 
implementation of this strategy. 
D. IRAQ 
In the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime 
in Iraq, British forces assumed responsibility for securing, developing, and transitioning 
Iraq’s Shia-dominated southern provinces to Iraqi control.116 Numerous competing 
political factions employed armed militias to intimidate, dissuade, and eradicate their 
rivals as well as attack British forces.117 The British left only 9,000 troops after the initial 
invasion to stabilize an area encompassing tens of thousands of square miles with a local 
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population in the millions. Consequently, they were never able to mount a comprehensive 
campaign to increase security, develop local institutions, or separate the populace from 
the developing insurgency in order to destroy it.118 
In part, the British were unfortunate victims of the overall U.S. strategy that de-
mobilized Iraqi security services, de-Baathified the political and administrative 
institutions beyond their ability to function, and did not prioritize the South for 
development. They also suffered from a lack of commitment and financial support from 
the British government.119 Nor did abandoning the British practice of longer command 
tours for headquarters and staff do anything to improve the situation.120 During the six-
year British effort in southern Iraq, the British-led Multi-National Division (South East) 
(MND-SE) had eleven commanders. The Deputy Commander of Multi-National Forces-
Iraq (the Senior British Representative) rotated an equal number of times. The British 
Deputy Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq rotated 10 times. Only three flag 
officers out of a total 32 rotations served more than one six-month tour. None served 
three.121 Standing headquarters with staggered manning were foregone in favor of 
deploying cohesive units, as per the American practice. Institutionalized local knowledge 
necessary to produce a comprehensive campaign strategy was impossible to obtain, let 
alone maintain. After transitioning responsibility for some areas to Iraqi control, the 
British focused on building security services, but the short-term focus on meeting force-
size goals by specific dates produced insufficiently capable forces to secure areas as they 
transitioned.122 This was akin to Frank Kitson’s criticism of the focus on number of 
enemy killed as a metric. He attributed this unproductive tendency to frequent changes in 
forces when no long-term vision is developed.123 
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Even if the British had developed a long-term strategy to address the underlying 
problems well before they withdrew in 2009, the ability to gain local knowledge and earn 
the trust and confidence of the population would have been limited. Six-month long unit 
tours with all rotations executed at the same time militated against building relationships 
at the unit level.124 In-depth, continuous intelligence development, the province of local 
Special Branch offices in previous wars, was also sacrificed when entire units rotated 
completely. Each new rotation had a “blank canvas.”125  
What is especially surprising about MND(SE) is that the British experience in 
Northern Ireland offered two successful mitigation techniques for frequent unit rotations 
that were not used to great effect in Iraq.126 Perhaps these techniques to build in 
continuity were too difficult to implement in detail given the fact that the British forces 
were ultimately subject to American decision-making in Iraq or that the British 
government never seemed fully committed to the effort, which was never meant to last 
very long.  Nonetheless, both techniques are worth examining. 
E. MITIGATING THE LACK OF CONTINUITY 
While a few British units were employed in specific areas for two-year tours and 
headquarters and staffs served two- to three-year tours to ensure continuity in Northern 
Ireland (1969 to 2007), many units were on six-month rotations. To assist them, 
beginning in 1972, units deploying to Northern Ireland were given pre-deployment 
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training from the Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team. Each unit received in-
depth, area-specific briefings and training on intelligence, operations, politics, enemy 
organizations, and persons of interest in the area where they would be operating. Units 
assigned to different areas received very tailored training. Those teaching them were 
veterans of multiple tours in Northern Ireland and had conducted recent visits to their 
specific areas to keep the training updated and relevant. A collective exercise 
incorporated recent information and served as the final capstone event for the training.127  
A second method the British used to mitigate the churn caused by constant 
rotations was to designate continuity officers and NCOs. These individuals were 
specifically selected to serve two-year tours. Their job was to observe and participate in 
critical activities, such as intelligence-gathering and analysis. With the local knowledge 
and experience they gained, they were then supposed to help new units transition into the 
area once they arrived. This system of serving in a long-term post to provide continuity 
for those on shorter tours was institutionalized and is still present in the current British 
counterinsurgency manual.128 
F. LESSONS OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
As this sampling of British counterinsurgency experiences suggests, maintaining 
continuity has been a contributing factor to success, while its absence appears to be 
detrimental to long-term goals. Continuity in leadership enabled the continuous 
development of strategy over time, which helped the British and those they were 
supporting capitalize on progress and address failure. Having continuity in staff and 
supporting agencies helped to execute those strategies and facilitate development of key 
ideas over time. Experience enabled people to further improve the strategy. At the unit 
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level, meanwhile, continuity permitted local tactics and solutions to be addressed to the 
different requirements of different areas.  
The British experience not only demonstrates a number of ways to work toward 
continuity and local knowledge, but also emphasizes the importance of practicing what 
you preach.129 Interestingly, Britain’s most significant former colony borrowed more of 
its counterinsurgency approach from the French experience. India thus offers a different, 
but equally useful, approach to achieving continuity.  
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VI. INDIA’S RASHTRIYA RIFLES 
The Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles are designed and trained specifically to 
conduct counterinsurgency in the northern Indian province of Jammu and Kashmir.130 
The organization and manning of the unit emphasizes maintaining local knowledge and 
continuity. On its face, the example of a domestic counterinsurgency may not appear to 
be particularly relevant to improving U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in foreign countries, 
but there are a number of circumstances that make this a worthwhile case. First, while the 
Rashtriya Rifles conduct counterinsurgency internal to India, in most parts of Kashmir 
they operate in areas that are declared “disturbed.” Under India’s 1990 Armed Forces 
Act, this effectively means the area has been designated a combat zone and functions are 
carried out under military rather than police authorities, as if units were deployed to a 
foreign country. Second, the Rashtriya Rifles have developed a novel form of the 
individual replacement system to man these permanently forward-deployed units.131 
Finally, despite stumbling blocks, the Indian Army has been committed to developing a 
dedicated counterinsurgency force that values continuity and consistently improved and 
refined the concept over two decades. Consequently, the Rashtriya Rifles’ experiences 
highlight both the benefits that can be gained and pitfalls that should be avoided when 
trying to maintain continuity in a counterinsurgency. 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The insurgency in Kashmir was gaining steam in 1989, marking the latest chapter 
in a long-standing historical dispute over an area divided among India, Pakistan, and 
China.132 Pakistan’s claim to Indian Kashmir is rooted in the presence of a majority 
Muslim population; India fights to maintain its existing sovereignty over the province as 
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well as to protect the large minority Hindu population.133 Both, meanwhile, claim rights 
to China’s portion. Insurgent groups in Indian Kashmir engage in armed resistance 
against the Indian government for varying reasons. Some want independence; others seek 
Pakistani rule.134 When the insurgency resurged in the late 1980s, police and border 
security forces under the Ministry of Home Affairs, traditionally tasked with 
counterinsurgency in India, proved incapable of suppressing the insurgency.135 At the 
time, the Indian Army was heavily engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Sri Lanka 
and other conflicts within India. In the Indian Army’s view, committing further forces to 
counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir would degrade the country’s ability to defend 
itself against external threats.136 This problematic situation presented an opportunity for a 
new initiative. 
B. A TENTATIVE SOLUTION 
General Bipin Chandra Joshi, then Chief of the Indian Army, supported an idea 
that arose from Army staff planners: the establishment of a separate counterinsurgency 
force outside the regular Army.137 The proposed organization would be temporary and 
could be raised outside of Army manning caps and the regular budget, preventing strain 
on the existing forces allocated to national defense.138 In Sri Lanka, the Indian Army had 
suffered continuity problems caused by unit rotation. To avoid this, the proposed new 
force would be trained in counterinsurgency methods and permanently assigned a 
specific operational area.139 Active army personnel from existing units would be put on 
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deputation to the Rashtriya Rifles; the donating unit would gain new personnel in their 
place. This was one way to get trained personnel into the Rashtriya Rifles expeditiously 
and avoid the expensive and time-consuming process of building the force from raw 
recruits.140 The program would start small, with two brigade-sized Sector Headquarters, 
each commanding three battalions. In October 1990, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed 
the authorization to stand up the organization with a limited initial budget. The new 
Rashtriya (National) Rifles would be “All-India, All-Class.”141 
One advantage to drawing personnel from the Army writ large rather than from 
specific regions or ethnicities is that this ensured the force had no latent sympathy for the 
insurgents. But it also meant the organization lacked local knowledge.142 To help ensure 
that institutional memory could develop, the Army assigned individuals to the Rashtriya 
Rifles on staggered two-year tours.143 An eight-week counterinsurgency school and one 
month in-unit training were the primary tools used to reshape new members, refocus 
them on counterinsurgency, and impart local knowledge.144 An overarching strategy 
guided the Rashtriya Rifles to operate persistently in assigned areas, objectively without 
being compromised by local loyalties, and cooperatively with other Army and Ministry 
of Home Affairs units in adjoining territories.  
The organization was kept flat and responsive to enable each unit to adapt to local 
conditions. To maximize numbers of ground personnel capable of interacting with the 
populace and developing local knowledge, two heavy companies (normal in regular 
infantry battalions) were both replaced with light companies.145 This also enabled a small 
logistics footprint that would tie into existing local structures. Administrative tasks, such 
as pay issues, promotions, and leave, were left to the regiments of the regular Army that 
assigned personnel to the Rashtriya Rifles. This freed the Rashtriya Rifles organic 
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support structure to focus on intelligence and communications.146 By design, the basic 
unit structure was adapted to maximize the units’ ability to gain and exploit local 
knowledge and intelligence and to establish the continuity necessary to wage a 
counterinsurgency.  
C. PROBLEMS ARISE 
During the first few years of the units’ employment—in effect the pilot phase of 
the program—a number of difficulties arose. While minimizing the administrative 
structure allowed a greater focus to be placed on intelligence and operations, the design 
of the individual replacement system contained a flaw that led to decreased morale and 
unwillingness among soldiers to join the Rashtriya Rifles. Since soldiers were drawn 
from all over the Army, the few administrative personnel within the Rashtriya Rifles 
battalions found themselves having to deal with as many as 28 parent regiments. They 
were overwhelmed by the workload and systemic delays in promotions, pay, and leave 
impacted morale and degraded unit effectiveness.147 
This same system had another unintended effect.  When every infantry regimental 
commander in the Indian Army was tasked with providing 10–20 percent of his men to 
the Rashtriya Rifles, commanders often viewed this as an opportunity to transfer 
underperformers and individuals with disciplinary problems. This practice hindered the 
ability of the Rashtriya Rifles to successfully indoctrinate everyone, damaged unit 
cohesion, and prevented the development of a high quality organization.148 
Although maintaining continuity was a founding principle of the Rashtriya Rifles, 
drawing personnel from many different units combined with individual rotations resulted 
in an actual loss of continuity.149 Soldiers would come in, receive training and 
experience, and then go back to one of the many parent regiments. The system was 
unable to ensure that personnel would then return to the same Rashtriya Rifles battalion if 
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they were re-assigned to the Rashtriya Rifles. This resulted in a loss of institutional 
knowledge and experience and worked against the maintenance of local knowledge that 
had been the intent behind the establishment of the Rashtriya Rifles. 
In a complex operational environment, actions in one area can have an effect on 
the situation in adjoining areas.  Insurgents, support mechanisms, and intelligence often 
cross boundaries that different counterinsurgency organizations build between 
themselves. Often, cooperative measures are necessary to overcome these divides that 
insurgents otherwise take advantage of. Unfortunately, institutional rivalries between the 
Indian Army and Ministry of Home Affairs sometimes prevented such cooperation.150  
Maintaining the intended continuity within the Rashtriya Rifles could have helped build 
relationships to overcome these obstacles over time. 
D. RESTRUCTURING 1994–1996 
In 1994, the organization’s performance and resources were reviewed with an eye 
toward determining the future of the Rashtriya Rifles experiment.151 The success of the 
unit and continued commitments by the regular Army contributed to the decision to 
extend and expand the temporary Rashtriya Rifles program.152 This review was also used 
as an opportunity to correct some of the deficiencies identified during the first few 
years.153 
Accordingly, to eliminate the backlog of administrative issues, a relationship was 
established between each Rashtriya Rifles battalion and a single parent regiment.154  
Through this relationship, a single regular Army regiment would provide soldiers and 
administrative support to a specific Rashtriya Rifles battalion. This arrangement between 
specific units also allowed standardization of the requirements for assigning personnel to 
the Rashtriya Rifles.  New physical, cognitive, and experiential standards required each 
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commander to assign higher quality soldiers to the Rashtriya Rifles.155 The return of 
these soldiers to their parent regiment after their tour with the Rashtriya Rifles made it in 
a unit commander’s interest to abide by these standards. The length of individual tours in 
the Rashtriya Rifles was extended from two years to three or four. Counterinsurgency and 
unit training were doubled to six months.156 Leave and pay incentives were introduced to 
encourage qualified individuals to volunteer, compensate them for longer tours, and 
encourage repeat assignment.157 These measures notably improved unit cohesion and 
effectiveness, but also contributed to the maintenance of valuable local knowledge and 
experience within Rashtriya Rifles units. 
E. THE RASHTRIYA RIFLES TODAY 
The Rashtriya Rifles design has been lauded as an organizational innovation in 
counterinsurgency.158 Its increase in force structure from six to 66 battalions (with the 
addition of four division-level Force Headquarters) as well as an overall 1400 percent 
budgetary increase suggests that successive Indian administrations credit the Rashtriya 
Rifles for some of the success quelling the insurgency in Kashmir.159 The regular Army 
has likewise seen a reduction in its counterinsurgency role in Kashmir.160 To be sure, the 
Rashtriya Rifles has its detractors, and exactly how much difference the unit has made is 
debated.161 Arguably, additional measures to combat insurgency in Kashmir such as 
pressure on Pakistani safe havens, a border fence, and increased police capabilities have 
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also contributed.162 Nonetheless, a survey of recent English-language Indian news 
articles, however, shows positive coverage of the Rashtriya Rifles and gives them credit 
for India’s success.   
Repeated calls since 2000 to redeploy elements of the Rashtriya Rifles to other 
troubled areas in India are further evidence of the effectiveness of the Rashtriya Rifles.163 
Of course, such a move would seem to undermine the purpose of creating a Kashmir-
oriented counterinsurgency force. The risks of such a move were illustrated in 1999, 
when Rashtriya Rifles units were redeployed from stable areas in Kashmir to the 
Pakistani border in order to support the Army in a border dispute. Once these units left 
their assigned areas, violence increased.164 This anecdote illustrates the significance of 
maintaining continuity for stability, but also highlights the danger of relying on it as a 
crutch at the expense of lasting peace.  
F. LESSONS OF THE KASHMIR EXPERIENCE  
The success of the Rashtriya Rifles has removed some of the stigma associated 
with the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in the Indian Military. Worth noting is 
that the current Chief of Staff of the Indian Army was a Force Headquarters commander 
in the Rashtriya Rifles.165 The presence of persistently engaged forces, along with 
continuity of personnel and policy, has contributed to the counterinsurgency success in 
Kashmir. The lessons that the Rashtriya Rifles have learned over the past 20 years offer 
compelling evidence for the importance of institutional knowledge and local experience. 
By establishing permanently stationed headquarters and locally assigned units and 
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supporting them through a specifically designed administrative and training system, the 
Rashtriya Rifles have maximized continuity and produced a force with the ability to 
devise local solutions to erode the power of the insurgency and increase stability. 
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OPERATIONS 
The absence of continuity in U.S. counterinsurgency operations can be seen as a 
result of two things. First, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine does little to address the 
importance of continuity in long-term campaigns. Second, since continuity is seemingly 
not important, the systems that provide forces to support U.S. counterinsurgency 
campaigns do not account for continuity when manning and allocating forces for 
deployment. The results of this inattention to continuity cause campaigns to become more 
protracted, less effective, and costlier than necessary. Instituting a few measures, inspired 
by both classic counterinsurgency theory as well as British and Indian methods, can help 
mitigate these effects. Permanently-stationed headquarters designed specifically for 
counterinsurgency campaigns, minimum two-year command and staff tours with 
staggered manning at non-tactical headquarters, modification of the unit rotation and 
assignment policies to pair specific units with specific regions during a campaign, 
establishment of area-specific continuity cells on extended tours, and requirements that 
area-specific training packages be tailored for each deploying unit are all fairly simple 
concepts that can be implemented to redress some of these problems. Management and 
resourcing of the systems needed to execute these measures, however, is much more 
complicated. Thus, integrating continuity into U.S. doctrine is necessary to ensure that 
these methods are implemented to, in turn, ensure more effective counterinsurgency 
campaigns. 
The U.S. does generally understand and implement the concept of permanently 
stationed, purpose-built headquarters. The Defense Department divides the world into 
regions and gives responsibility for each region to a specific Geographic Combatant 
Command to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. These are commanded and staffed 
using an individual replacement system of three-year tours. This tour length is sacrosanct 
and takes a Defense-Department-level waiver to shorten.  The stationing of these 
headquarters, either within U.S. territory or on the soil of a long-term ally (Germany), 
however, means that, when contingencies arise, the conceptual leap is not made from a 
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standing long-term engagement headquarters to approaching the establishment of a 
headquarters for waging a particular counterinsurgency the same way.  In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, permanent headquarters were eventually established with Multi-National 
Forces-Iraq (later U.S. Forces-Iraq), the International Security Assistance Force, and U.S 
Forces-Afghanistan.  The manning for these headquarters, however, utilized one-year 
tours for staff.  For commanders, the U.S. has made some attempt to capitalize on local 
knowledge and theater commanders have usually had prior command experience within 
that theater.  Command tours, however, are managed on an individual basis and usually 
only last between one and (in the case of General Raymond Odierno) two years.  
In both the British and Indian examples, continuity of policy and strategy in 
commanders and staffs was a function of standing headquarters, extended tours, and 
staggered rotations. During a two- to three-year tour, a commander had time to 
implement and, more importantly, assess a strategy and had a staff with one to two years 
of continuous experience in that theater. Establishing relationships with local officials, 
understanding which programs are working and which are not, and ensuring that the local 
priorities of tactical commanders support the overall strategy are achievable goals when 
people are afforded the time to develop local knowledge and experience.  As Robert 
Thompson pointed out, one year is insufficient. Certainly, for commanders and staffs at 
U.S. theater and operational level headquarters, implementation of staggered extended 
tours of two years would help achieve Russell Volckmann’s principle of continuity of 
policy. The benefits to the overall development and execution of strategy over time are 
clear. Without a strategy that could be iteratively and continuously developed and 
improved, the victories in Malaya and Oman or progress in Kashmir would not have been 
possible.  
There is a disadvantage to continuity at this higher level. The risk of being 
saddled with a bad commander or strategy is very real in the minds of U.S. strategists and 
must be addressed. Case in point: General William Westmoreland commanded forces in 
Vietnam for four years.166 For reasons still subject to debate, in the end, his strategy did 
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not work; the painful legacy of that failure echoes throughout the U.S. military to this 
day. To help prevent such an outcome, impartial review, conducted both internally and 
externally, must be periodically undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy. 
More importantly, the recommendations of the reviewers must be heeded.  Without such 
reviews in Malaya in 1950, the change in strategy would not have been possible. 
Attention to continuity should not, however, mask inadequacy or failure.  The change in 
strategy in Malaya would likewise not have been possible without a changing of the 
guard in key posts in 1950–51.167  
For the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, subordinate operational commands (such as 
the Multi-National Corps and Divisions in Iraq or the International Joint Command and 
Regional Commands in Afghanistan) with responsibility for tactical units are standing 
headquarters in name only. They have, at their core, rotating units of corps or division 
headquarters.  This generates the same problems as unit rotation at the tactical level.  
While standing up permanent headquarters with individual replacements, akin to the 
Force Headquarters of the Rashtriya Rifles, would establish continuity and foster better 
institutional memory, the size of such an undertaking makes such a solution impractical.  
Instead, the permanent assignment to one of these regional operational commands of a 
single unit headquarters with responsibility for manning and rotating personnel from its 
home station would be sufficient to help headquarters maintain an institutional memory 
and local knowledge continuously over time. Managing these tours on a staggered basis 
with length of duty as extended as possible would help build continuity. A commander of 
this division or corps would ideally spend his entire command tour in charge of a region 
of the theater, with a rotating staff underneath him from a pre-identified pool of 
individuals from his home station.  A concomitant increase in the allocation of personnel 
to the unit would be necessary to sustain this, but each headquarters could tailor its needs 
in both personnel and rotations based on local conditions.   
Universal individual rotation in lower-level units on permanent forward 
deployment, as practiced by the Rashtriya Rifles, or even the extended three-year tours of 
                                                 
167 Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 129–30.  
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the British in bygone days, are not feasible for the U.S. military. Unit cohesion and 
effectiveness are enhanced with units rotating rather than individuals.   Additionally, the 
disarray caused by individual rotation and short command tours in Vietnam are still fresh 
in the military’s institutional memory. Thus, culturally-speaking, individual rotation is 
not achievable. A variation on the Rashtriya Rifles model, however, does make sense. 
Tactical-level units, subordinate to the geographically oriented regional commands, could 
operate on a rotational basis within a finite group—for example, with a three to one ratio 
where one battalion is deployed, one is resetting, and one is training to deploy. These 
three units could repeatedly trade responsibility for the same area (as operations dictate). 
With tours as long as possible but as short as necessary, units in an area with a high level 
of violence and kinetic intensity could rotate more frequently (for example, every four 
months). Units in a more stable area could have longer tours. Continuity could be tailored 
depending on the geographic orientation of specific units, higher casualty rates, or greater 
stress levels on a rotational basis. To avoid the constant shifting in priorities that occurs 
when tactical units and the headquarters two levels above them rotate at the same time, 
these rotations should be offset, as should be the rotations of units in adjoining areas. 
Having a persistently present higher headquarters would ensure that priorities continue to 
meet objectives and bridge the gaps that unit rotations currently create. The emphasis that 
could then be placed on carrying out the long-term work of counterinsurgency could help 
advance the overall strategy in a continuous manner and would decrease the one-
upsmanship in setting new priorities that the churn of rotation promotes and the visibility 
theory of promotion predicts. The tying of units to an area would also reinforce units’ and 
commanders’ long-term interest in the development and success of sustainable local 
programs, as opposed to the fire-and-forget attitude that the current rotational model 
encourages. 
Not even this, however, is enough. While continual local knowledge is acquired 
over repeated tours to the same area, some disadvantages inherent to frequent rotations 
would remain.  Continuity cells on two-year tours would help mitigate some of these 
remaining problems. These cells, drawing from British doctrine, would tie in to the 
intelligence and operations processes at each level in their assigned headquarters with a 
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focus on maintaining area specific information regarding the terrain, enemy, trends, 
operations, local government, and personalities. Experience shows that rotations result in 
data loss over time in part because the units themselves are responsible for maintaining 
this data. One way to prevent this and maximize use of available technology is to make 
separate continuity cells responsible for cataloguing and archiving operational and 
intelligence records for specific areas and to make this user-friendly. Having extended 
chronological records indexed by subject for specific areas spanning the entire campaign 
would be highly valuable to rotating units. No broad solution to this problem is currently 
available.168 These records would also assist the cells with their secondary task: to help 
keep informed area-specific pre-deployment training teams. 
As the British did in Northern Ireland, area-specific pre-deployment training 
packages with a high level of detail and operational relevance should be developed 
through the efforts of the continuity cells and pre-deployment training teams. Current 
U.S. models for this usually involve either externally organized general set-piece pre-
deployment training or internal unit-designed training that is as specific as possible but 
lacks detailed information about the area imparted by prior experience and deep local 
knowledge.169 Training teams dedicated to this task, akin to those the British used in 
Northern Ireland, would provide continuity for the periodically rotating units, especially 
if they paid periodic visits to the subject areas and were tied to the continuity cells. 
A permanent regional headquarters combined with the continuity cells would also 
provide the flexibility necessary in any campaign. Inevitably, areas become stable, less 
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important, or are sacrificed for higher priorities and units must move. The regional 
commands and continuity cells would have the ability to offer consistency in terms of 
guidance as well as serve as repositories of historical information, intelligence, and 
knowledge for any new units assigned to the area. This is rarely accomplished under the 
current system in which units can abruptly be given new areas of responsibility mid-tour.  
While these measures address some of the issues related to local knowledge and 
institutional memory, they do not help with developing relationships and building trust 
with local officials and the populace. To the extent feasible, key advisory relationships 
should be identified as early as possible as should specific individuals to work with those 
local nationals or organizations for extended tours. Of course, repeated episodic 
engagements by a small pool of individuals drawn from repetitively rotating units over a 
number of years will not lead to the same degree of trust that can be developed by a 
single individual who is there continually, but this still represents a decisive improvement 
on rotating successive individuals with changing priorities.  
To return to Luttwak’s view—that SOF are a more appropriate tool for 
counterinsurgency—one reason for this is that SOF are organized and have the authorities 
to adapt personnel and unit rotation policies as the situation requires. When and where 
possible, SOF establish habitual relationships between units and specific locales, emplace 
standing headquarters, and stagger rotations. But, by virtue of SOF’s relatively small size, 
the sustainability and broad application of such methods to large theaters is limited. For 
efforts that require greater involvement by the broader military, it is imperative that the 
importance of continuity be internalized throughout that broader force. 
These measures to establish continuity introduce additional challenges in 
resourcing, coordination, personnel management, and logistics flows to an already 
complex system. Obtaining increased resources for more frequent rotations, additional 
manpower for individual rotations at standing headquarters, and more robust force 
structure for continuity cells, training teams, and dedicated advisory personnel would 
present a significant fiscal challenge in the current resource-constrained environment. 
Implementing systems to manage this added complexity would hamper planners and, 
again, require more resources. Significant resistance to such measures is easy to imagine, 
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especially since every initiative comes down to a fight over resources among 
stakeholders—something as true for Frank Kitson in the 1970s as it is today. Kitson even 
acknowledged this situation and found that it highlighted the importance of educating 
people in the larger support structure about the necessity for continuity in 
counterinsurgency. For Kitson, understanding the importance of maintaining continuity 
needed to be universal across the force, among operators and administrators alike.170  
One crucial element in the education of the force is to change entrenched 
attitudes. For instance, immense prestige accrues to both units and individuals who serve 
in combat. This leads to a ‘share the wealth’ attitude regarding combat assignments, 
encouraging the practice of ensuring as many individuals and units get to rotate through 
the fight as possible. There is a ‘share the pain’ attitude also associated with this same 
phenomenon.  Consequently limiting the pool of rotational forces deserves further study. 
First, what incentive structures are needed to ensure the viability of a program that only 
commits part of the force to operations? Maintaining continuity is predicated on 
institutional memory and this requires that individuals remain in units for long periods of 
time. What is required to encourage this behavior? Second, the stress of repeated 
deployments to intense conflict zones takes a psychological toll that cannot be offset by 
incentive programs. The military currently struggles with how best to mitigate this, but if 
counterinsurgency is to be waged more effectively and expediently, enabling a smooth 
transition to host nation government responsibility faster, then figuring out how to 
maintain continuity by keeping individuals in the field for longer or more frequent 
periods of time needs to be made a priority. 
Instituting measures such as those described above flies in the face of inertia, 
bureaucracy, and the current method the U.S. military uses to wage counterinsurgency. 
Systemic changes always come down to a single question in the military. Are they worth 
the resources they cost to implement? In the case of continuity, the historic correlates are 
clear, while the recent U.S. practice of ignoring it point to continuity being worth the 
commitment of resources and personnel up front to reap the benefits in lives, stability, 
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and development later. The significant challenge to altering the course of future U.S. 
counterinsurgency efforts will be to propagate these lessons so that decision makers and 
resource providers alike understand the value that maintaining continuity brings to long-
term campaigns like counterinsurgency.  
The current sentiment throughout the United States government, and American 
society, is that long, static wars such as those following 9/11 are wars of choice and these 
experiences have taught the U.S. not to choose such wars in the future. Consequently, 
drastic reforms in the way the U.S. conducts counterinsurgency may not be popular or 
institutionally desirable. But, as a popular military aphorism puts it, the choice is not 
always up to one side and ‘the enemy has a vote.’ Despite the general belief that such 
wars will not be necessary in the future and are to be avoided, it is essential that there be 
thoughtful reflection about these recent conflicts. This must include examination of a new 
paradigm for waging long-term campaigns—common in counterinsurgency—so as not to 
repeat and compound the mistakes of the recent past that resulted from inattention to 
continuity. The cost in blood and treasure of prolonged campaigns is too great when they 
are unnecessarily ineffectual for too long. 
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